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This paper considers the technical aspects and the consequences, in terms of simulation 
results and policy assessment, of introducing imperfect competition in a CGE model. The 
modifications to the standard CGE framework needed to model imperfect competition in 
some industries are briefly discussed. Next, the paper examines whether, how much and 
why, those changes may affect the qualitative output a typical simulation experiment. It is 
argued that technical choices made in designing the model structure may have a significant 
impact on the model behavior. This is especially evident when the model output of an 
imperfect competition closure is compared with the one of a standard closure, assuming 
perfect competition. As an illustration, a simulation of agricultural trade liberalization is 
analyzed. Results from the same simulation exercise, but produced by alternative model 
formulations  (one  standard  competitive  and  three  imperfect  competition  variants)  are 
presented and discussed. It is found that having imperfect competition in a CGE model 
does  matter  in  terms  of  simulation  results.  Furthermore,  alternative  formulations  of 
imperfect competition typically bring about quite different findings and implications. 
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 1 Introduction
The standard Computable General Model (CGE) is based on typical Walrasian hy-
potheses: perfect competition and price-taking, market clearing, free entry/exit and
zero (extra) proﬁts. However, a number of CGE models now embed market imperfec-
tion features, like price-setting and market power in some industries (since the seminal
work by Harris (1984) ), especially in the ﬁeld of trade policy analysis, where imper-
fect competition is often associated with the presence of economies of scale (Harrison,
Rutherford and Tarr (1997)).
Introducing imperfect competition in a CGE model is not too difﬁcult. However, a
number of critical choices have to be made, having important consequences on simula-
tion results and their interpretations. Nonetheless, there is not a single, or “right”, way
of accommodating market imperfections in a CGE framework.
There are many models of oligopolistic market, which can be adopted as a theoret-
ical paradigm. Key differences regard assumptions about strategic behaviour, expec-
tations and market entry. Additional assumptions regard price discrimination, product
differentiation, etc. All these issues are not speciﬁc to the CGE world, but normally
arise in Industrial Organization.
To introduce market power in a CGE setting, further issues need to be tackled,
which are associated with the translation of partial equilibrium concepts in a general
equilibrium context. One example is the computation of the perceived demand elastic-
ity in mark-up equations.
Extra data is needed to calibrate CGE models under imperfect competition. This
information is not (completely) available, especially at the aggregation level which is
typical of CGE models, so that other ad hoc assumptions need to be imposed, like
symmetry among ﬁrms within an industry.
Remarkably, few papers provide an adequate description of the methodology adop-
ted to include market power. This may suggest that there exist a standard procedure, or
that the estimation of IC parameters is a (boring) technical issue, with little impact on
the overall qualitative behaviour of the model. Unfortunately, this is not at all true.
This paper discuss some technical and conceptual issues associated with the in-
troduction of imperfect competition in a CGE model. We illustrate the main points by
considering a typical simulation exercise. This exercise simulates agricultural trade lib-
eralization in Europe, comparing a standard CGE model closure with three alternative
model closures, in which imperfect competition is introduced, in different formula-
tions. Liberalization in agricultural markets is a much discussed topic, especially in
relation with the Doha round of world trade agreements and the CAP reform in the
EU. Although we aim at giving a ﬂavour of realism to the exercise, this has not been
designed for policy assessment, but only to illustrate the implications of adding imper-
fect competition in a “typical” CGE application. Nonetheless, some interesting points
emerge.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, technical aspects of im-
plementation of IC features in a CGE model are discussed. The following section
address the question of whether, how much and why, the output of a simulation under
an IC closure could differ from the one obtainable under a standard closure. The fourth
section introduces the illustrative simulation exercise, and compares the results under
2alternative market structures. Some concluding remarks are drawn in a ﬁnal section.
2 Introducing Imperfect Competition: Technical As-
pects
2.1 The Perceived Elasticity of Demand









where mc is the marginal cost, p is the price and   is the perceived price elasticity of
demand. Perceived elasticity means the percentage change in the demanded quantity
which is supposed to take place after a percentage change in price. If there is only
one ﬁrm in an industry, this coincides with the industry demand elasticity. If not, the
perceived elasticity embodies assumptions about the other competitors’ reaction to a
change in the price of the speciﬁc price setting ﬁrm (conjectural variation).
In a standard CGE model with perfect competition, constant returns to scale imply
that average costs equal marginal costs, and the zero proﬁt condition can be simply
stated as p = mc = ac. This condition is replaced by equation (1) in an imperfectly
competitive closure. So one question is: which value should be used for the perceived
elasticity parameter?
There are many elasticity parameters in a CGE model. However, these refer to
elasticities of substitution, not to elasticities of demand. Most CGE models use nested
combinations of CES functions to model substitution possibilities in production and
ﬁnal demand (either directly, or through the special cases of Cobb-Douglas, Leontief
or LES functions).
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(xi/xj) is the (constant) elasticity of substitution.
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where Aiis a scaling factor, and pyis a price index for the aggregate output y:
py =
p1x 
1 + p2x 
2
y
= p1  
1 + p2  
2 (4)
where the asterisk indicates optimally chosen (cost-minimizing) inputs or input-
output shares ( ).
3Equations like (3) can be used to directly estimate the industry elasticity of demand.
However, the methodology used in CGE applications is not uniform, because of the
presence, or absence, of some “hidden assumptions”, which we brieﬂy discuss here
below.
Hidden Assumption #1 (HA1): Aggregate quantity does not depend on input prices.
In other words, the aggregate y (industry output, utility, intermediate composite) is
taken as given when the demand elasticity is computed. This is a standard assumption
in partial equilibrium analyses, but it would not be entirely consistent with a general
equilibrium formulation. In a general equilibrium, all markets are interlinked, and it
is not generally true that y stays constant when even one single input price changes.
Almost all CGE implementations assume this effect to be small and negligible. Hoff-
man (1999) proposes an alternative, empirical technique, in which standard CGE mod-
els are used to numerically estimate the true elasticity value (by simulating marginal
price changes). This approach, however, may be problematic when there are many
imperfectly competitive industries, as the simultaneous estimation of several elasticity
parameters poses a number of technical difﬁculties.1
Hidden Assumption #2 (HA2): The aggregate price index does not signiﬁcantly
change when a single input price changes.









py is a cost share parameter.
The effect on the price index of a price change for input i can be neglected only
if si   0 . In this case, substitution and demand elasticities coincide. This type of
assumption has been adopted in most applications of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model
(e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999)), and in a few CGE models (e.g., Swami-
nathan and Hertel (1997)). In the more general case, if HA1 holds:
 i =     si  (6)
Notice that the elasticity  i may easily be lower than one. This may happen if the
substitution elasticity   is also lower than one, as it is often the case, and/or if the
market share siis close to one (e.g., domestic products in domestic markets, in large
economies). But if the elasticity  i is lower than one, it cannot be directly used in a
mark-up equation like (1), as it would be the case for a monopolistic ﬁrm.2
Very often, CES functions are nested. For example, a CES function could be used
to model substitutability among primary factors, and another one between aggregate
1This is because elasticity values for all industries are needed to compute the equilibrium after a marginal
changeinoneprice. Inotherwords, allelasticityvaluesareinterdependent, andshouldthereforebeestimated
simultaneously.
2This is a direct consequence of assumption HA1. For example, if one factor is sold to an industry with
Leontief production structure, both demand and substitution elasticities would be zero. A proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrm would then set the price of the factor to inﬁnity. But, when the factor price gets large, also the industrial
price rises, reducing the industry output and the indirect demand for the factor. This effect is not taken into
account when HA1 is adopted.
4value added and aggregate intermediate inputs. To illustrate how equation (6) has to be
changed for nested CES structures, suppose that the aggregate composite y is itself an
input to a higher level aggregate z. In this case:
 i =  y(1   si) +  zsi(1   sy) (7)
where the subscripts indicate the relevant substitution elasticity or cost share pa-
rameter.3
In CGE models, ﬁrms are assumed to be active in many markets: intermediate
inputs, ﬁnal consumption, investment goods, etc., of each region. If there are r regions,
m industries, k sectors of ﬁnal demand, there are r(m+k) markets. Since there are ﬁrms
in rm industries, and if ﬁrms in each industry are assumed to be symmetric, there could
be as much as r2m(m+k) price-setting equations like (1). This amounts to assuming
that ﬁrms can discriminate and apply different prices to different markets.
A convenient alternative hypothesis is ruling out price discrimination. In this case,
there would be a single industry price, like in standard CGE models. Determining the
global industry elasticity would then amount to determining the demand elasticity for





where the index i refers to the different markets, and zi is the market (quantity)
share in the total output of the industry.
Notice that market elasticity is given by a linear combination of elasticities of sub-
stitutions, where factors are derived from cost shares, whereas the total industry elas-
ticity is given by a linear combination of market elasticities, where factors are market
shares.
Equations like (7) and (8) can be used to estimate the market price elasticity. This
is not, however, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc perceived elasticity, used in the mark-up equation.
The latter can be derived from the industry elasticity, on the basis of the speciﬁc model
of oligopoly that has been selected. This classical IO problem is reviewed, in the
context of CGE models, by Francois (1998) and Willenbockel (2002). Perhaps the
most popular option entails assuming a Cournot competition (a Nash equilibrium, in
which production levels are taken as strategic variables) in a market with n symmetric
ﬁrms. In this case, the ﬁrm-level elasticity ( fi) is simply given by:
 fi = n i (9)
Therefore, increasing the number of ﬁrms in a market produces a higher perceived
elasticity, and a lower mark-up. To the limit, for n going to inﬁnite, the proﬁt mark-up
vanishes and the market becomes perfectly competitive. More generally:









3Under HA2 we still have, even for nested CES structures:  i =  y.
5where qfiis the quantity produced by ﬁrm f in market i.
Notice that, if the parameter   is assumed to be ﬁxed (or, equivalently, the number
of ﬁrms is ﬁxed in a Cournot formulation), the industry and perceived elasticities vary
proportionally. On the other hand, whereas the industry elasticity is computed from
substitution elasticity parameters of the model, the perceived elasticity, because of its
role in the mark-up equation (1), needs to consistent with observed (marginal) proﬁts
in the industry.
2.2 What is a market?
The term “market” usually refers to the place where goods or services are exchanged.
So, for example, we say “the market for paddy rice in China” or, to a ﬁner disaggre-
gation scale, “the market for imported steel used by the car industry in Australia”. For
reasons that will be explained in the following, CGE models with imperfect competi-
tion often adopt a different concept of market, based on the origin of trade ﬂows, rather
than on their ﬁnal destination.
In standard CGE formulations, industries are modelled through a representative
ﬁrm selling in all markets: domestic and foreign, intermediate and ﬁnal consumption.
In imperfect competition settings, the representative ﬁrm is replaced by a ﬁnite number
of ﬁrms. Are these ﬁrms also selling in all markets? If yes, who are the competi-
tors? How many there are? These questions are key to determine the actual degree of
competitive pressure faced in each market.
The Armington assumption postulates that goods produced by representative ﬁrms,
in different countries, are imperfect substitutes. If this hypothesis is retained under im-
perfect competition, goods produced by ﬁrms located in the same region turn out to be
more easily substitutable, among themselves, than between goods produced in differ-
ent regions. This amounts to adding a further layer in a nested structure of substitution
possibilities.
Competition vis-à-vis foreign ﬁrms is already taken into account through the com-
putation of the industry price elasticity (e.g, equations (7) and (9)). Therefore, when
the ﬁrm-level perceived elasticity is derived, only competition from domestic ﬁrms has
to be accounted for. For example, if Cournot competition is assumed, the number of
ﬁrms in equations like (9) refers to the number of ﬁrms active in the domestic origin of
trade ﬂows, not in the ﬁnal destination market.
Often, domestic competition is modelled differently than international competi-
tion. Indeed, industry elasticities in equations like (6) are expressed as partial (price)
derivatives of demand functions. In economic terms this amounts to assuming price
(Bertrand) competition in differentiated goods. If Cournot competition is assumed for
domestic competition, this is like saying that each ﬁrm sets its proﬁt-maximizing pro-
duction level, while taking production levels of all domestic ﬁrms as given, but prices
of all foreign ﬁrms as given.4
To eliminate this inconsistency, two options are available. The ﬁrst solution is
assuming that even ﬁrms within the same region compete à la Bertrand (with differen-
4Clearly, any increase in production by one ﬁrm would imply a loss of demand for other ﬁrms. If supply
is kept constant, prices for the other ﬁrms would fall. Therefore, assuming constant prices would entail a
compensating decrease in the production level of external ﬁrms.
6tiated products). In practice, this adds one further layer in the demand structure; for
example, a CES function among domestic ﬁrms.
The second option is dropping the Armington hypothesis altogether, like in Swami-
nathan and Hertel (1997). In this case, there should not be layers in the demand struc-
ture. All products of all ﬁrms would compete at the same level, e.g., within a single
CES function, in all markets. Because of the very large number of ﬁrms active in any
market, HA2 would then be a reasonable working hypothesis, greatly simplifying the
estimation of the perceived price elasticity.5
2.3 Economies of scale
There can be imperfect competition without economies of scale. However, imperfect
competition is needed to accommodate economies of scale in a market equilibrium.
In a general equilibrium, cost functions are endogenously determined on the ba-
sis of the optimally selected mix of factors. In general, the cost structure depends on
output levels, unless the production function is homothetic. In a homothetic function,
demand for all inputs is proportional to output at constant (relative) factor prices, mean-
ing that the average cost is ﬁxed (that is, there are constant returns to scale). All popular
functions used in CGE models are homothetic (Leontief, Cobb-Douglas, CES, or any
nesting of homothetic functions).
Economies of scale exist (locally) if average production costs are (locally) decreas-
ing in production levels. One simple way of introducing economies of scale is by
assuming that a proportional increase in all factors entails a more than proportional
increase in output y, which is equivalent to an increase in the multi-factor marginal
productivity. Suppose that the structure of inputs is independent of the output scale;
in this case, the cost function (c(y)) is proportional to factor inputs, and there exists a
simple relationship between relative variations of total (multi-factor) productivity (a),
































Francois (1998) notes that the ac/mc ratio is constant if :
c(y) = ky  (13)
where k and   are given parameters.
As a consequence, to get increasing returns in a model, it is sufﬁcient to vary total
productivity parameters, according to equation (12). Decreasing average costs imply
ac>mc, so that ac/mc>1, and multi-factor productivity becomes an increasing function
of factor demand and output volume.
5This would create other problems, though. For example, one should then explain why proﬁt margins
may differ among industries.
7An alternative way to introduce economies of scale is making an explicit distinc-
tion between variable and ﬁxed costs. Variable costs depend on production levels.
Therefore, they can be easily modelled through constant returns to scale, homothetic
production functions, exactly like in the standard CGE closure with perfect compe-
tition. Fixed costs account for all costs that do not depend on production levels on
the short run. As each individual ﬁrm incurs ﬁxed costs when active on the market,
industrial ﬁxed costs depend on the number of ﬁrms, not on production volumes.
Gørtz and Hansen (1999) observe that ﬁxed costs can be introduced by adding a
ﬁctious consumer, whose consumption levels do not depend on income, but on the
number of ﬁrms. This technical solution has the merit of solving one potential draw-
backassociatedwiththetotalproductivityapproach. Assumingthateconomiesofscale
only operates through changes in the multifactor productivity is equivalent to assuming
that a fraction of the industrial product is used to pay for ﬁxed costs. If, instead, ﬁxed
costs are accounted for in a separate sector, different cost structures could be adopted.6
2.4 Calibration
Calibration is the standard procedure, by which structural parameters in a CGE model
are estimated. It amounts to assuming that equilibrium conditions, as speciﬁed in the
model, holds at a given time, for which economic data is available. Most of the data
usually comes from a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). The SAM can be used to
estimate industrial production volumes, industrial demand for intermediate factors and
value added components, prices and tax levels. However, it cannot provide the extra
information required by an imperfect competition closure, like: relative amount of
ﬁxed costs, proﬁt margins, number of ﬁrms, types of strategic interaction.
To see how the extra IC parameters can be estimated, let us consider three equa-
tions, deﬁning the market equilibrium for an imperfectly competitive industry with
symmetric ﬁrms:
p = ac(y) +   (14)








Equation (14) is an accounting identity, stating that price equals the sum of average
costs and unitary proﬁts. Prices are observed at calibration time.7 All cost components
are also observed, but proﬁts are not. Proﬁts are embedded in a residual component
of the value added which, in standard CGE models, accounts for payments on capital
6The sum of variable and ﬁxed costs should be consistent with observed industrial costs in the base year,
though. Information on the structure of ﬁxed costs is not readily available. Yet, independence of the cost
structure to production levels is such a poor approximation, in many cases, that even educated guesses would
provide a more realistic solution.
7Actually, units of measure are chosen for exchanged quantities, such that all prices are normalized to
unity.
8services.8 Therefore, there are three options available for the determination of unitary
proﬁts:
• proﬁts are estimated using additional information, breaking down the residual
component of the industrial value added;
• proﬁts are assumed to be initially zero.
• proﬁts are assumed to be always zero, because of free entry in the market (mo-
nopolistic competition).
Equation (15) states that the sum of production levels for all the n symmetric ﬁrms
must equal the total industrial output volume, which is itself a function of the industrial
price and other variables.
Is it possible to estimate the baseline number of ﬁrms? Clearly, real markets are
not symmetric, so the question is selecting parameter values, such that the modelled
industry satisfactorily “resembles” the real one. In some CGE models, information
on market concentration is used to this purpose. A popular concentration index is the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (HHI): the sum of squared market shares of active ﬁrms.9
The number of (symmetric) ﬁrms could then be estimated, such that the number of
ﬁrms is consistent with the observed HHI index.10 In general, nothing ensures that the
estimated value for n is an integer number.
Equation (16) is the usual mark-up equation, in which the elasticity value may
depend on the number of ﬁrms. Some studies are available, providing estimates of
industrial mark-ups (e.g., Oliveira-Martins et al. (1996), Abaysiri-Silva (1999), Maioli
(2003)). If information on mark-ups and the number of ﬁrms has to be reconciled with
estimated industrial elasticities, the only possibility is to add one degree of freedom,
through the introduction of conjectural variation parameters (see equation (10)). A well
known problem of using arbitrary values for conjectural variations, however, is that the
implied strategic behaviour may not be logically consistent (a competitive equilibrium
may not be a Nash equilibrium).
To sum up, ﬁve additional pieces of information are involved in the calibration of a
CGE model with imperfect competition, all referring to the base year:
1. initial unitary proﬁts or industrial mark-ups
2. industry elasticities
3. number of ﬁrms or production level per ﬁrm
4. conjectural variations, which amounts to choosing a speciﬁc oligopoly model, or
ﬁrm-speciﬁc perceived elasticities
8Notice that some payments may be directed to foreign citizens, if they own part of the capital stock, or
other primary resources. Analogously, shares of proﬁts may ﬂow abroad as well.
9Notice that, as pointed out earlier in this paper, by “number of ﬁrms” we mean here the number of
domestic ﬁrms in an industry.
10It turns out that this is just the inverse of the HHI, if the HHI is expressed as a number between zero and
one.
95. a measure of economies of scale, expressed by the ac/mc ratio, or equivalent
parameter
Since equations like (14)–(16) have to be satisﬁed in the calibration equilibrium, not
all the parameters above are needed. Several combinations are possible, in which some
parameters areset ex-ante, while the remaining ones are obtained through calibration.11
Since several options are available, it is not surprising that there is no standard proce-
dure for the calibration of a CGE model with imperfect competition.
3 Introducing Imperfect Competition: Implications for
Model Results
3.1 Shock Propagation
Results obtained by CGE models with imperfect competition are typically compared
with results generated under a standard closure, with perfectly competitive markets.
The aim is understanding whether or not adding imperfect competition makes a dif-
ference. The point we want to make here is that the answer relies on how some key
parameters have been estimated.
Consider, for example, the effects on market prices of a variation in production
costs. This variation may be due to changes in productivity, changes in taxes or sub-
sidies or, as we shall consider later is this paper, to changes in the cost of production
factors. In a perfect competition setting, any cost change simply translates into a price
change. In imperfect competition, prices are determined by a mark-up over (marginal)
costs. Therefore, if the mark-up stays constant, prices are proportional to costs. This
means that, for example, a 1% increase in costs implies a 1% increase in price, both in
perfect and imperfect competition.12
However, mark-ups do generally vary, according to the deﬁnition of perceived de-
mand elasticity adopted in the model. As an illustration, consider the simple case of an
industry (i) selling in just two markets (1 and 2), and competing (in each market) with
only one other product (j). This case is taken here for simplicity, but it can easily be
generalized to the case of multiple markets and multiple inputs. Equations (8) and (6)
can be reformulated as:










i =  r   sr
i r (18)
To start with, consider equation (17) and suppose that elasticities in the sub-markets
areconstant. Thiswouldbethecase, forinstance, ifassumptionHA2hasbeenadopted.
11For an example, see Bchir et al. (2002).
12Nonetheless, if the same SAM is used to calibrate a model for both perfect and imperfect competition,
differences may arise, because of differences in baseline marginal costs. Marginal costs may be lower in im-
perfect competition if proﬁts are assumed to be initially positive, so that the cost of capital is correspondingly
reduced. When this happens, cost shocks may be relatively stronger in imperfect competition.
10Does the global elasticity vary after changes in the industrial price? Yes, because, even
if sub-market elasticities are constant, market shares are not. In particular, we show in
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Therefore, any increase in price, for example due to higher production costs, is
generally associated with a smaller elasticity (in absolute value), which means a higher
proﬁt mark-up. As a consequence, prices exhibit wider ﬂuctuations in imperfect com-
petition than in perfect competition: cost shocks have a more signiﬁcant impact. Equa-
tion (19) also highlights under what conditions this effect is more signiﬁcant, that is
when (1) sales are not concentrated in a few markets, and when (2) sub-market elastic-
ities are quite different.
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That is, a sub-market demand elasticity may increase or decrease, depending on
the value of the associated substitution elasticity. A sub-market elasticity stays approx-
imately constant: (1) if the product is dominant in the sub-market or, vice versa, (2)
if it is marginal; (3) if there is little substitution among goods; (4) if the substitution
elasticity is close to one (the Cobb-Douglas case, implying constant cost shares).
Combining the results (19) and (21) we cannot establish, in general, if the mark-up
will increase or decrease. However, since the sign of (19) is unambiguously negative,
and the impact of (20) on the overall industrial elasticity is weighted by market shares,
the ﬁrst effect is likely to dominate in most circumstances. This means that cost shocks
would have a wider impact in imperfect competition than in the standard competitive
closure.13This effect is further ampliﬁed if production technology is characterized by
economies of scale.
With free entry and exit in the market, the price is also determined by equality with
average costs (14), and the number of ﬁrms is endogenous. In other words, mark-ups
and perceived elasticities may change, even if industrial elasticities do not change. If,
for example, a cost shock is interpreted in terms of higher marginal costs, this would
generate higher prices, lower production volumes (at the industry and ﬁrm level), less
ﬁrms in the market, a lower perceived elasticity and a higher proﬁt mark-up. There-
fore, this additional mechanism also ampliﬁes the impact of cost shocks in imperfect
competition.
3.2 Second-Best Economics
CGE models with imperfect competition may behave differently than standard CGE
models. This is true not only in quantitative terms, as we noted above, but also from a
13Notice that, in a partial equilibrium model with linear demand curves, the opposite result holds.
11qualitative perspective, and especially in terms of welfare. In essence, the differences
rely on a distinction between ﬁrst and second-best optima.
General equilibrium theory tells us that an unrestricted perfectly competitive equi-
librium is a Pareto optimum. This means that global welfare cannot be improved fur-
ther. A calibrated equilibrium in a standard CGE is not an optimum, however, because
of the existence of distortionary taxes and subsidies. Any policy reducing the amount
of initial distortion is globally beneﬁcial, as it can be interpreted as a step towards the
right direction. For example, trade liberalization is good (globally). Substitution of a
tax with another one, having a larger base, is also good.
Things are not so straightforward under imperfect competition. This is because of
the presence of market power in some industries, creating an additional distortion, in
termsofexcessivelylowproductionvolumes. Inasecond-bestworld, whenadistortion
is added on top of another distortion, the situation may not necessarily worsen. In
the same vein, removing a distortion may not be always beneﬁcial. This is because
distortions can (partly) compensate each other.
Economies of scale add further complications. Even if there is no market power
(e.g., in the case of natural or regulated monopoly), economies of scale are associated
withexcessivelylowproduction andconsumptionlevels. Non-convexitiesandmultiple
equilibria can be easily found. For example, production of a homogeneous good can be
concentrated in one region, or another. It could be possible, therefore, that introducing
shocks in economies, characterized by increasing returns to scale, may bring about
non-marginal changes in the equilibrium state.
4 An Illustrative Simulation Exercise
To illustrate the main points discussed in this paper, we present a simulation exercise
based on the GTAP database and model, suitably modiﬁed to embody imperfect com-
petition features in some industries.14
The GTAP database is a SAM matrix of the world economy which, in its latest
version (6-2001 data), is disaggregated in 86 regions/countries, 56 industries and 5
primary resources. For this simulation, we have chosen to aggregate the data to three
regions, three industries and four primary factors. Regions include: EU at 25 countries
(including new accession countries), NAFTA (USA, Canada, Mexico), and Rest of
the World (ROW). Sectors are: Agriculture (Agric - including ﬁsheries and forestry),
Manufacturing (Mnfcs - including food processing) and Services (Svces).
The GTAP model is a conventional, comparative static CGE model, which can
be calibrated with the GTAP database, at any level of aggregation. The structure of
the model is fully described in Hertel (1996).15 In the model, goods and services are
14The model code, written in the TABLO language for the GEMPACK software (Harrison and Pearson
(1996)), is a available at: http://venus.unive.it/roson/Soft.htm .
15Any release of the GTAP database is accompanied by an updated version of the GTAP model. Therefore,
the structure of the current model is slightly different from the one described in the reference, but changes
are only marginal. Several variants of the basic model exist. For example, dynamic/multiperiodal, or having
a different formulation of energy consumption and emissions. More information on the model, data sources
and applications can be found in the GTAP website: www.gtap.org .
12produced by competitive regional industries and sold to domestic and foreign indus-
tries and consumers. A representative agent in each region receives income from the
value of the owned primary resources,16 and allocates the expenditure between sav-
ings, private and public consumption. Utility maximization and cost minimization are
the behavioral rules for the price-taking ﬁrms and consumers.
Demand for any produced good comes from domestic and foreign markets. The so-
called Armington assumption is adopted, meaning that goods within the same industry,
but produced in different regions, are considered to be imperfect substitutes. For all
intermediate and ﬁnal demand components, substitution occurs within a double-nested
structure. At a lower level, goods produced in different foreign countries are combined
(through cost-minimization in a CES function) in an import composite good. The
elasticity of substitution used in this process is quite high: 7.524. At a higher level,
the import composite is combined with the domestic product, using an elasticity of
substitution of 3.155.
The model can be calibrated with the GTAP database, so that general equilibrium
is assumed to hold for the base year (in this case, 2001). A general equilibrium is a
state in which supply matches demand in all markets: goods, services and primary fac-
tors. Simulations are typically carried out by shocking one exogenous parameter,17 and
generating a new, counterfactual equilibrium. Comparison between the two equilibria
provides useful information about structural changes, variations in trade ﬂows, relative
competitiveness and welfare.
WehavemodiﬁedthebasicGTAPmodel, toallowforthepossibleexistenceofmar-
ket power in manufacturing industries. Imperfect competition is introduced according
to three alternative formulations (IC1, IC2, IC3), and simulation results are compared
withthoseobtainedundertheconventionalperfectcompetitionclosure(PC).Proﬁtsare
accounted for through the inclusion of a ﬁctious endowment commodity, whose supply
is endogenously adjusted by the model, so as to satisfy the mark-up equation (1), where
marginal costs are computed as the cost of all factors (primary and intermediate) used
in the production process, except the ﬁctious proﬁt resource.
In model version IC1, constant returns to scale are assumed, and the number of
ﬁrms in imperfectly competitive industries (or, equivalently, the value of the conjec-
tural variation parameter) is given.18 The model is calibrated by assuming that both
baseline proﬁts and capital debt service are included in the SAM capital income ﬂow.
For all imperfectly competitive industries of all regions, the calibration database is in-
tegrated by a set of coefﬁcients, telling the model how the initial capital endowment
has to be split in the two components: proﬁts and ordinary capital. To this purpose, we
use parameters consistent with estimates of mark-ups in manufacturing, obtained by
Oliveira-Martins et al. (1996).19
16Labour and capital stock are perfectly mobile domestically, whereas land and natural resources are
imperfectly mobile. All primary factors are internationally immobile.
17The partition between endogenous and exogenous variables in the model is not ﬁxed, and can be easily
changed.
18This number is not computed. This is because the model equations are formulated in terms of percentage
change, so it is not necessary to know the value of any parameter that is kept constant in the simulations.
19A simple, unweighted average of mark-ups for all manufacturing industries gives a share of proﬁts in
total output value of about 13%, for all regions. Remarkably, this is only slightly below the share of total
capital income of our baseline SAM (EU 13.8%, ROW 14.77%, NAFTA 15.55%). Other works in the



















NAFTA 3.74 26.74% 15.55% 2
EU 2.38 41,97% 13.80% 4
ROW 2.19 45,76% 14,77% 4
In model version IC2, we assume Chamberlinian monopolistic competition, with
zero proﬁts, free entry, and economies of scale. In this case, there is no need to esti-
mate unitary proﬁts (which are always zero), but the cost function needs to be speciﬁed.
For the sake of simplicity, we adopt a cost function like (13), which has the convenient
property of a constant ac/mc ratio. Since price equals average cost (no proﬁts), then the
mark-up, as well as the perceived demand elasticity at the ﬁrm level, are also constant.
The number of ﬁrms adjusts endogenously, to ensure consistency between the constant
ﬁrm-level elasticity and the varying industry-level elasticity. For example, if the in-
dustry demand elasticity increases, then the number of ﬁrms decreases.20 Changes in
multifactor productivity are approximated through a two-steps procedure. The model
is ﬁrst run with ﬁxed mark-ups and constant productivity. Changes in industry output
(for Mnfcs) are then used to estimate the implied variation in productivity, according
to equation (12).
Model version IC3 is similar to IC1, but baseline proﬁt margins, and the number
of ﬁrms in each imperfectly competitive industry, are directly taken from the model
calibration data-base. Table 1 summarizes the procedure. By combining exogenously
given elasticities with market shares, readily obtainable from the baseline data set, it
is possible to estimate the initial value of the industry demand elasticity. The ﬁrst
column of Table 1 reports the computed values for the three manufacturing industries
in the three regions. The second column displays the implicit unitary proﬁt margin,
associated with the computed demand elasticity, relative to a hypothetical monopolist
operating in each industry. However, these proﬁt levels are not consistent with the
share of capital income in the total output value for the three industries, as can be read
in the calibration SAM. This is because total capital income should include both proﬁts
and debt service, so it must be greater than the amount of proﬁts. We therefore assume
empirical literature have found higher mark-ups, whose values would be inconsistent with our database.
20Iftheindustrydemandelasticitydecreasesandthenumberofﬁrmsiskeptﬁxedintheshortrun, theprice
would temporarily fall below the average cost, driving some ﬁrms out of the market. When the oligopolistic
market is a symmetric Cournot (in which the number of ﬁrms is treated as a continuum variable), the percent-
age decrease in the number of ﬁrms equals the percentage increase in the industry elasticity. Furthermore,
the quantity produced by each ﬁrm varies, in percentage, as the sum of percentage variations of industry
output and industry elasticity.
14Table 2: A comparison of basic assumptions and calibration methodologies for the
three imperfect competition model versions
Assumptions about IC1 IC2 IC3
Initial unitary proﬁts Taken from literature Zero Calibration consistent
Proﬁts in counterfactual equilibrium Endogenous Zero (free entry) Endogenous
No. of ﬁrms (or con. var. parameter) Fixed (reconciling el.) Endogenous Fixed (calibrated)
Economies of scale No Yes (ﬁxed ac/mc ratio) No
that manufacturing industries are not monopolistic, but rather are Cournot oligopolies,
where the number of ﬁrms is the minimum integer number compatible with the con-
straint of unitary proﬁts not exceeding the capital income share. Indeed, by augment-
ing the number of competitors inside each industry, ﬁrm-level elasticities are increased,
and unitary proﬁts are reduced, for the same value of industry-level elasticity. The last
column of Table 1 shows the minimum number of (identical) ﬁrms, consistent with
calibration data.
Table 2 summarizes the basic hypotheses adopted in the three model variants with
imperfectcompetition. Wecanalreadynoticethat“assumingimperfectcompetitionfor
manufacturing industries” may have rather different meanings. It remains to be seen
whether or not taking one route, or the other, really brings about different outcomes in
the simulation exercises.
To this end, we use this modiﬁed GTAP model, in its four versions (PC, IC1, IC2,
IC3), to run a typical simulation exercise of trade liberalization. More precisely, we
simulate the unilateral removal of all import tariffs and export subsidies for agricultural
goods in the EU-25. Since agriculture is a much protected industry in Europe, this
policy implies a signiﬁcant drop of agricultural market prices in Europe and an increase
in the world prices. Trade ﬂows among the three regions vary as shown in Table 3 (the
ﬁgures refer to the standard PC closure).
The manufacturing sector (the only one where ﬁrms have market power) is not di-
rectly affected by the trade liberalization policy. However, there are impacts on this
industry as well, both because some intermediate inputs are purchased from the agri-
culture sector, and because there are changes in the composition of the intermediate
and ﬁnal demand in all industries and regions. Table 4 shows how changes in trade
ﬂows for manufactured goods have been estimated by the model.
The European manufacturing industry improves its relative competitiveness, in-
creasing sales in both foreign and domestic markets. However, since demand elasticity
is higher in foreign markets, foreign market shares increase and the overall (indus-
try) demand elasticity increases as well (whereas the opposite occurs in NAFTA and
ROW). This may have different consequences, depending on the model version. In IC1
and IC3, ﬁrm-level elasticities are proportional to industry-level elasticities, so that
proﬁt margins shrink in Europe and expand elsewhere.
In IC2, unitary margins (p/mc ratios) do not vary, by assumption. The higher
15Table 3: Changes (%) in trade ﬂows of agricultural goods (PC)
From\to NAFTA EU ROW
NAFTA 0.36 7.22 1.56
EU -2.08 -7.90 -9.40
ROW -0.71 20.24 0.45
Table 4: Changes (%) in trade ﬂows of manufactured goods (PC)
From\to NAFTA EU ROW
NAFTA -0.04 -0.24 -0.09
EU 0.44 0.24 0.39
ROW -0.12 -0.32 -0.16
(lower) industry elasticity is compensated by a lower (higher) number of ﬁrms. When
competitiveness improves, each ﬁrm produces more, thereby expanding its production
scale and efﬁciency, because of economies of scale. The ﬁrm-level output expansion is
not only due to the overall industry growth, but also because there are less ﬁrms in the
industry, since the industry elasticity increases.
Table 5 compares some results obtained by various model runs. The table presents
percentage changes for supply prices, estimated under the standard PC closure, and
ranges of values produced by the three IC model versions. Under imperfect competi-
tion, price variations are generally wider. For example, prices of European manufac-
tured goods diminish, not only because of cheaper agricultural inputs, but because of
lower proﬁt margins in IC1 and IC3. In IC2, mark-ups stay constant, but the shock
is relatively stronger than in perfect competition, because baseline marginal costs are
smaller. Therefore, imperfect competition acts here, in all three IC formulations, as a
booster of policy impacts. Other results produced by the model (production volumes,
consumption levels, etc.) have a similar interpretation.
One can see from Table 5 that numerical results do not differ too much between
perfect and imperfect competition, as well as between the three variants of imperfect
competition. One may then be tempted to conclude that introducing imperfect competi-
tion does not fundamentally alter the model results, and also that alternative approaches
for the introduction of market power are quite equivalent.
To see that this conclusion is erroneous, let us look at the estimation of the equiv-
alent variation (EV) in the four model versions. The EV is the hypothetical change
in income which would have produced the same effect on the welfare of representa-
tive consumers in the three regions, at constant (baseline) prices. Table 6 presents the
results for this money-metric measure of changes in utility levels.21
Neoclassical trade theory tells us that trade liberalization, even a unilateral one,
21In millions of 2001 US$.
16Table 5: Changes (%) in supply prices, in alternative model versions
PERFECT COMPETITION IN ALL INDUSTRIES
Ps (PC) NAFTA EU ROW
Agric 0.25 -1.19 0.51
Mnfcs 0.01 -0.06 0.02
Svces 0 0.01 -0.02
IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN MANUFACTURING (Min./Max.)
Ps (IC) NAFTA EU ROW
Agric 0.24/0.26 -1.21/-1.12 0.43/0.5
Mnfcs 0.01/0.02 -0.08/-0.06 0.03
Svces 0/0.01 -0.04/-0.11 -0.08/0
bringsaboutaggregatewelfaregains. ThisisastandardresultinmodelswithaHecksher-
Ohlin-Samuelson structure, like this one, and it is conﬁrmed by the results obtained
with the perfect competition formulation.
Whenimperfectcompetition istaken intoaccount, however, welfareis alsoaffected
by the distortionary effects of market power. In IC1 and IC3, total welfare gains are
larger, because there is a reduction of market power in the European manufacturing
industry, curbing one type of market distortion, in addition to the one associated with
trade barriers.22 In IC2, there are no changes in market power, but the overall burden
of deadweight losses is higher,23 and it is only partly compensated by global gains in
productivity.
Distributional effects are strikingly different between the various scenarios. Un-
der perfect competition, Europe is the region getting most most of the welfare gains.
This outcome could possibly justify a unilateral liberalization policy. However, in IC1,
Europe is basically unaffected (actually experiencing small welfare losses), whereas,
on the contrary, North American countries grab most of the gains. The reason behind
the differences has to do with changes in the terms of trade. In essence, market power
acts as a sort of export tax in foreign markets. An export tax is beneﬁcial to the home
country (but not globally), to the extent that part of the tax is paid by foreigners.
The IC3 story is about the same. The only fundamental difference is that base-
line proﬁts are generally smaller than in IC1,24 meaning that IC3 turns out to be an
22Therefore, in this speciﬁc exercise, pre-existing market distortions reinforce the primary effect of the
implemented policy. In other cases, however, initial distortions could counteract, nullify, and even reverse
the effect of other policies.
23In a partial equilibrium model, if demand is linear and the mark-up is ﬁxed, a reduction of marginal
costs brings about a reduction in the deadweight loss ((p-mc)(q(mc)-q(p)/2)). This results does not hold if
the demand is sufﬁciently convex. The demand function is strongly convex if the price elasticity increases
signiﬁcantly at lower prices (this is indeed the case here).
24One exception is NAFTA, where initial proﬁts are slightly higher in IC3.
17Table 6: Estimates of equivalent variation (EV) in the four model versions
EV PC IC1 IC2 IC3
NAFTA 54.78 836.48 -855.32 805.63
EU 721.72 -3.99 7128.92 313.78
ROW -419.63 -307.69 -7307.19 -634.58
Total 356.87 524.8 -1043.32 484.83
intermediate case between PC and IC1.25
The IC2 scenario is somewhat more difﬁcult to interpret. First, notice that, al-
though there are no proﬁts, the difference between price (of manufactured goods) and
marginal costs is due to the value of some national productive resources.26 This value
enters the GDP and welfare calculations much in the same way as ordinary proﬁts.
These “pseudo-proﬁts” are a constant share of the value of output in the manufacturing
industry. Since the price elasticity of demand for Mnfcs is quite high, any reduction
(increase) in the industrial price brings about an increase (reduction) in the value of the
Mnfcs output and in “pseudo-proﬁts” for this industry. This means wider welfare gains
for Europe and more signiﬁcant losses elsewhere. Changes in multifactor productivity
further strengthen this effect.
5 Concluding Remarks
Introducing imperfect competition in a Computable General Equilibrium model entails
inserting and adapting concepts originally conceived for partial equilibrium models of
Industrial Organization. Not surprisingly, the whole undertaking is not straightforward,
as it involves a series of conceptual issues. However it is not a daunting, technical task,
whose description has to be relegated in a short appendix, at the end of the paper.
A number of alternative options in model design have been examined in this paper.
Some of these technical solutions can be found in the CGE literature, although they are
not usually compared. To highlight the key differences between the standard competi-
tive model closure and alternative formulations of imperfect competition, we made use
25However, there are losses in EV for ROW, larger than both PC and IC1.
26For example, suppose that primary factors include a “manufacturing-speciﬁc capital”, in addition to
labour, ordinary capital, land and natural resources. Suppose that units of this speciﬁc capital are needed to
start producing manufactured goods, so that ﬁxed costs generate economies of scale. If there are no proﬁts,
the difference between average and marginal costs accounts for rent payments to the owners of the speciﬁc
capital resource. In terms of national income and GDP, there are no fundamental differences between proﬁts
and rents of this type. Furthermore, as proﬁts exist because entry is restricted in a market, proﬁts themselves
could be interpreted as the rent of a special resource: the right to operate in an imperfectly competitive
industry.
In this exercise, we calibrated the IC2 version with the same data set used for IC1 and IC3. Baseline proﬁts
are therefore re-interpreted precisely as the value of some unspeciﬁed factors, accounting for the difference
between average and marginal costs. An alternative approach would be calibrating the model with the data
base used for PC (in which there are no proﬁts), while changing the multifactor productivity according to
equation (12). In this latter case, ﬁxed costs would be paid with a share of production output.
18of an illustrative numerical exercise. In this exercise, we simulated a unilateral trade
liberalization policy in the European agriculture sector (with and without market power
in manufacturing).
We found that, although values for some variables may not change very much
among the various model versions, distributional effects and welfare impacts do de-
pend quite signiﬁcantly on the type of model closure. As the distribution of gains and
losses is fundamental in any policy assessment, choices about market structure and
calibration techniques clearly are very critical factors in the development of any CGE
model.
Nonetheless, we would like to stress once again that there is not a “right” way of
modelling imperfectly competitive industries. Rather, exercises involving CGE models
with market imperfections should be designed in such a way that technical choices are
clearly stated, adequately illustrated and justiﬁed, on the basis of the speciﬁc context
of analysis.
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